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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE PEKIN RELIEF EXPEDITION.

BY CAPTAIN WILLIAM CROZIER, U. S. A., CHIEF ORDNANCE OFFICER
ON THE STAFF OF GENERAL CHAFFEE, COMMANDER OF
THE AMERICAN CONTINGENT IN THE RECENT
EXPEDITION FOR THE RELIEF OF PEKIN.

THE readers of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW are familiar with the history of the Pekin Relief Expedition. It will be recalled that the advance to Pekin was commenced on August 4th, having been preceded by the failure of the Seymour relief column, the capture of the Taku Forts and the battle at Tientsin. The nations represented in the advance were Japan, Russia, England, France and the United States. The French force which started with the expedition was small and was left on the fourth day out at Yangtsun, to guard the railroad crossing of the Peiho at that place. At Tung Chow, thirteen miles from Pekin, a mountain battery with about a hundred infantry, commanded by a Major General, again joined the column. The combatant force available was composed of approximately 8,000 Japanese, commanded by General Yamaguchi; 4,000 Russians, commanded by General Llinevitch, and 2,500 each of British and Americans, commanded respectively by Generals Gaselee and Chaffee. No common commander was chosen; the different contingents co-operating whilst retaining their independence. It fell out that the British, Japanese and Americans usually acted together, as did the Russians and the French. That this not very military arrangement resulted in no compromise of the success of the expedition was due probably to the fact that as a fighting task the job was not a hard one, there not being an active and courageous enemy to confront. The principal concern of each general was to keep his troops supplied and to get them into efficient condition

through the hardships of the trying march. The Japanese being the most numerous force, and being composed of troops of the three arms of the service in good proportion, and having a properly organized staff, lacked nothing necessary for independent action; their reconnaissances were always the most extensive and their information the most complete. Without the least tendency toward assumption they thus fell naturally into a position of initiative, and took a leading part in arranging the order of march and of battle. The British force also comprised infantry, cavalry and artillery; that portion which remained continually with the expedition consisted entirely of Indian troops. The Americans had the 9th Infantry, the 14th Infantry, a battalion of marines and Light Battery F of the 5th Artillery. Without cavalry they were deprived of tactical eyes and ears, and being thus dependent on others for information, and having too small numbers to act otherwise than as a compact unit, their only course was to fall in with the plans which were made for them. These always assigned to them a dignified part and involved a full share of the fighting. The Russians had with them infantry and artillery and a small number of cavalry; the French, infantry and artillery.

The first engagement was at Peitsang, and was fought, practically, by the Japanese; the others would have been glad to take a more effective part, but the nerve of the Chinamen was not sufficient to provide fighting enough to go around, and the Japanese, being in advance, got it all. On the following day occurred the combat of Yangtsin, at which the supply of fighting was again short, and the Americans and British, having the advance, got practically all there was. Peking was entered on August 14th, when all the forces were engaged except the British, who, after all, were the first to enter the legation enclosure; and on the 15th the Americans took the Imperial City, carrying the five successive gates leading through it into the Forbidden City. A fortnight afterward the Forbidden City was formally entered.

Knowing the salient facts of the expedition and something of the manner of their accomplishment, the reading public is now in position to take an interest in a comparison of the attributes and methods of the different forces. Comparisons have already been begun by different observers and are characterized by a mixture of praise with some very sharp blame. Most of the praise, as well as a small portion of the blame, is given to the soldier, and perhaps

by inference to his officer in the line, while, as is the fashion, the staff, in most accounts and current comments, comes in for tremendous rating in which there is no admixture of praise. Blame is wholesome, but in order that profit shall be taken from it it is necessary that it be bestowed with proper, not to say expert, discrimination, else we shall fail to make the right corrections.

To begin with the Subsistence Department, it is borne in upon the campaigner that the eatables and drinkables, if not the most important, are at least the most continuously insistent, of the indispensables. Of these there was an ample supply at Tientsin from the time of the arrival there of the first American troops; and they included not only the ordinary components of the ration but most of the delicacies classed as fancy groceries. Ginger ale and bottled waters were in abundance, and plenty was the order of the day. The food of our soldiers exceeded in quantity, quality and variety that of any of the allied forces, as was the comment of all foreign officers under whose notice it fell. When the march to Peking was taken up, however, the fare was less generous. All supplies directly accompanying the troops had to be carried in wagons or on pack mules, and of these means of transportation the command was very short, having sufficient only for carrying three days' rations and one hundred rounds of reserve ammunition per man; but, in common with the other contingents, we had a reserve supply of rations and ammunition following upon junks by the Peiho, of which the course was in the general direction of the march as far as Tung Chow, within thirteen miles of Peking. Such luxuries as tents, however, were out of the question, officers and men sleeping in the open air and taking the rain as it came.

The ration thus carried was reduced to about three pounds per man—the full ration in bulk with its packing cases weighing about five pounds per man—and comprised the staples: bacon, hard bread, sugar, coffee, rice, beans and condiments. Even so, it was better than was carried for the troops of any other nation; the Japanese had only rice and dried fish, the Indian troops mainly rice, the others a variety and quantity approaching, but not equalling, those of the Americans. No provision was made for supplying the United States troops on the march with water other than the canteen which each man carried. Other troops were better off in this respect; the British Indians carried water in skins on pack mules, and some had barrels upon carts. But

there are wells in all the Chinese villages, and these, along the line of march, were not more than a mile and a half apart; and, with the column properly halted, it is as easy to fill canteens from a stationary well as from a stationary cart or mule. The water in the wells was always cool, and, though seldom perfectly clear it was never revoltingly turgid, as was that of the river and canals; it was drunk freely by all the troops of the expedition. No other troops made such a time about water as the Americans, who had orders to drink none without boiling it, and had special utensils provided for the purpose. These orders could not be enforced, however, as thirsty soldiers will not wait, even when arrived in camp, for water to boil and cool. Portable filters were provided and were used in the hospital service; one also I observed in the Light Battery and one was in the headquarters mess. The characteristic ailment of north China, however, seems to come independently of the water; it attacks nearly all Europeans and Americans during their first summer, not sparing even those who drink nothing but imported waters. With careful inquiry I was unable to find a medical man who could assign a satisfactory reason, other than that it was "in the air."

I have neither heard nor read any criticism of the operations of the Subsistence Department other than as these were affected by lack of transportation, which suggests inquiry as to the character and quantity of the latter. The Americans had thirteen four-mule army-wagons and one pack train of forty freight mules, besides two or three ambulances and a Dougherty wagon. The four-mule wagon is considered to be distinctly superior to the means of transportation of supplies employed by any other nation. Loaded with 3,000 pounds of freight, and often with more, it made light of everything in the way of obstacles which the roads offered, and was much more economical, in both men and animals, than the two-wheeled, one-horse carts of the Japanese and Russians, with a driver for each vehicle. The latter would have been overloaded with more than 600 pounds each, of which, for a ten days' march, 150 pounds would have to be reserved for the food and baggage of the horse and man, leaving only 450 pounds of useful freight; whereas the four-mule wagon carries 2,580 pounds of useful freight, so that transporting power in carts equivalent to that of one wagon, four animals and one man would require five and three-quarters vehicles, animals and

men, costing much more and occupying twice the space on the road. The Japanese pack trains were organized with a man for each pony, who led him on the march; in the Indian pack trains, one man riding a mule led three other mules; the American train had one man to four mules, all of the loaded animals being driven in a bunch with a bell mare leading. Here also was economy of men, although perhaps the Japanese provision of a man to each animal was a necessity, as their ponies are all stallions, and their train, at a halt, was a bedlam of flying heels and wild snorts; it was more dangerous to pass than a Chinese outpost. A large proportion of the Japanese transportation consisted of pack animals; the British Indians had nothing else; the inferiority in economy, when contrasted with the American system, is striking when it is noted that it requires the same number of mules to carry 1,000 pounds on packs as will haul 3,000 pounds in our army-wagon. The American pack train carried ammunition only, for which purpose it could not have been replaced, as it afforded the only means of maintaining a first reserve supply in constant readiness for immediate distribution to the firing line. The pack saddles of the different nationalities were, in their effect on the animals, of about equal merit. Occasional sore backs were noticed in all the trains; but the American required the most skillful packer.

The indispensable *impedimenta* of troops in the field are always the occasion of delay in active operations. All the American troops which started for Peking on August 4th were at Tientsin by July 27th, except the Light Battery, which arrived on August 3rd; but the only vehicles for transportation were those which had been sent over in June with the Ninth Infantry. Others which followed the Fourteenth Infantry from Manila on the transport "Wyfield" were still aboard that vessel in Taku Bay, awaiting unloading and shipment up the river by the scanty means which, in the keen competitive press for them, had only been secured by energy and enterprise on the part of the Quartermaster's Department. The pack train arrived on the morning of August 4th, was loaded at the railroad station from the accumulation which it had been impossible to transport to the camp, and started with the expedition in the afternoon. Investigating the reasons for the lack of transportation, the facts show that the first troops sent over, the Ninth Infantry, had been abund-

antly supplied, but that this supply was subsequently stretched to take care of two regiments of infantry, a battalion of marines, a light battery and the headquarters. If it be asked why the additional troops did not have their own means of transportation immediately after their arrival, it must be remembered that an improvement in transportation conditions could have been insured only by the maintenance at Manila of a thoroughly provided depot for the dispatch of military expeditions, regarding the Philippines as an outpost for guarding the interests of the United States in the far East and equipping it accordingly.

The shortness of the American transportation, however, was at no time the cause of delay; while the advance to Peking from Tung Chow, the place where connection with the junks was finally broken, was delayed from the 12th till the 13th because of the plea of the Russians that their transportation had not yet come up. The large numbers of missionaries' families and other refugees and entrapped visitors, especially the ladies, who were sent down from Peking a day or two after its relief, owed the comfort of their journey to Tung Chow to the American ambulances and other vehicles, which were the only ones in that part of the world fit to ride in. Within three days after the arrival at Peking fancy groceries and bottled waters began to make their appearance in the American commissary, and within a week there was abundance of these for all.

A radical feature of the Japanese and British Indian organization is the employment in large numbers of auxiliary troops, or coolies, approximating fifty per cent. of the fighting force. Most of these accompany the baggage train and are used in drawing carts or as bearers, and they do the general work of the camps. Their employment may be justified in countries where men are cheap, and good animals and vehicles scarce, but it does not make for economy; their own rations and baggage have to be carried along, and if used as bearers they are more fatigued upon arrival in camp than the fighting troops, and, therefore, not in condition to work for the latter. During prolonged rests, it is well for soldiers to take care of themselves; the considerable number of coolies employed by the American forces in China and the Philippines, as litter bearers, etc., were believed by the officers to exercise a demoralizing effect upon the men, who were apt to develop an inability to carry a bucket of water or clean a gun.

If a sufficient number of four-mule wagons, the most rapid and economical transportation yet devised for countries in which they can go at all—and with a little help they can do marvels in the way of trail covering—be supplied to carry all the men's baggage except their arms and canteens, and in addition a sufficient number of armed men to act as train guards, riding either on the seats with the drivers or on others provided, these men would be sufficiently fresh to do the loading and other extra work, and the whole organization would be much more economical and serviceable than one provided with coolie corps.

From a competitive criticism of arms and personal and horse equipments, the American force comes out well; the infantry rifle, with some instances of remarkable endurance, sustained the reputation which it had acquired in Cuba and the Philippines. At Tientsin, when the troops crawled through the mud and lay in it for hours, the rifles became completely clogged; but, by taking them by the muzzle and swishing them through the water for a few seconds, they were restored to perfect action. The thimble belt, used only by the Americans, is still preferred to the cartridge pouches of the others. Our field artillery was as good as any there, although there was none of the most modern design, with its special effort to increase rapidity of fire by reducing the recoil of the carriage to a minimum. The McClellan saddle would fit anything from the largest sized American horse in good condition to a Chinese donkey, three feet high, in the last stages of emaciation; and allow either to be ridden without producing a sore back. No other hospital corps was provided with such means for transporting sick and wounded as our ambulances; the British doolies, or heavy, curtained litters carried by four men, were a poor substitute, and, considered as litters, were only half as economical of men as ours, which required only two.

In United States base and temporary hospitals, the patients were on cots; in the Japanese, they were on the floor, an illustration of the greater requirements—and their supply—of the American soldier. No other hospitals, either, had women nurses.

The shoes, hats, uniforms of the American troops, were not such as any would wish to exchange for those of the patterns used in other services, and no failure in their serviceable qualities was developed. The horses were coarse brutes compared with the high-class animals ridden by the English officers and the Bengal

Lancers, but in regard to its other war material the United States has learned no lesson of inferiority.

In regard to military organization, the same cannot be said. The other forces showed evidence of preparedness and readiness, resulting from the fact that each unit, as well as the general command, was complete with its transportation, drilled auxiliaries and staff assistants, all organized and accustomed to act together; while the American troops had to be sent as small independent units to China, to be there brought into relations with their staff and organized as a mobile force. It was again proved that our staff departments are of inadequate numbers. General Chaffee had to take his Adjutant-General from one of his line regiments, his Inspector-General from another, also his Chief Quartermaster of the expedition, as well as other officers for various staff duties; thus robbing the line, as we always do at the time when it can least spare its officers, depleted as it now is also by the officers required for the volunteer army. I do not think I am mistaken in saying that, of the two infantry regiments which marched to Peking, not one company possessed its full complement of officers, and that the majority had only one of the three allowed. We have no organized staff for purely military purposes disconnected from supply, such as collecting and disseminating information, arranging the details of movements, supervision of the condition of the forces, etc. The Adjutant-General's and Inspector-General's Departments and the Engineer Corps have, scattered among them, many of the elements of such duty, and there is nothing in our organization to prevent the first department from taking it up; but its officers are far too few for the purpose, even if they were selected with special reference to it; and in the field they, or the ones detailed for their work, speedily find all their time required to keep the orders, correspondence and records from hopeless confusion. When the hampering conditions under which it worked are appreciated, credit should be given by the country to the administration of the War Department for putting into the field, as promptly as it did, a force of respectable numbers, which was able to give a good account of itself. What could have been done without the Philippine base, forms a fit subject for reflection, when it is understood that every soldier, every pound of ammunition and supplies, and every wheel of transportation which reached China in time to

start on the relief expedition, came from that possession; lacking which, we would have been unable, like the Germans, to render effective co-operation in the relief of our people.

Another respect in which the United States force does not well bear comparison with the others, is that of the smartness and soldierly conduct of the troops. Both in China and on the way there, at Nagasaki, the men in going about were utterly careless as to their dress and bearing. The Japanese and Sikhs, at the rendezvous, in the camps and at Peking, whenever seen in public, wore their uniforms complete and properly put on, carried themselves with military bearing and were careful in saluting officers; and the heavy and somewhat awkward Russians, while not presenting so trim an appearance, were particular in these respects. American soldiers off duty walked around or rode in rickshaws without blouses, belts or leggings; with shirts open at the throat and breast, the sleeves unbuttoned and rolled up to different heights, or perhaps one flapping, and with the military-looking campaign hat worn in every shape and at every angle. Such sights were common. The American soldiers were the slouchiest of all, except the French. At Nagasaki, in addition to disregard of the arrangement of such portion of the uniform as they might have on, many were to be seen wearing travellers' caps of various shapes and styles. Their carelessness as to saluting officers must have caused some wonder among the people of the military nation considered to have recently emerged from barbarism, and among the Indian soldiers of lower civilization. The horse equipments of the British officers and of the Bengal Lancers were always cared for and neat, the leather having good surface and the metal shining. Let an American officer try to imagine one of our soldiers polishing a steel bit on a campaign! The belts and shoulder-pieces of the British officers were of uniform pattern, made to carry certain articles which they all had. American officers carried what they liked—usually a field glass and a pistol, the latter on such belt as suited their fancy. It is not intended to convey the impression that the American troops constituted anything like a mob; their control was never in the least degree out of hand, and they showed themselves, as heretofore, perfectly subject to such discipline as was exacted. They were the most intelligent of all the troops forming the expedition, as was strikingly apparent from observation of their faces at the good oppor-

tunity afforded by the march past the staff at the entry of the Forbidden City, on which occasion also their neatness and fine appearance were most gratifying. For such slackness as is here noted, the fault lies with the officers, the men being in this respect what the officers make them. They come from a people who are not in the habit of considering smartness as a necessary accompaniment of efficiency, but who, having only recently gone through the process of reclaiming a wild country, in which much had to be accomplished with little, have a high appreciation of the rough and ready, which they reflect. Americans have a tendency to stand up and fight, for which we are to thank God; it is for military training to give this quality its best chance of successful exhibition, by adding to it every feature which the best talent of the world judges useful in the composition of the soldier. Elements of the training are evidently lacking in our soldiers, and it is pertinent to ask why. Every regular regiment has now among its officers a good proportion of graduates of West Point, who, alone, would represent the knowledge of what constitutes a soldier's duty and contributes to his efficiency. Why is this knowledge not applied? In China, it certainly was not because of indifference on the part of the commander, whose own impulses are all the other way—but it would have been impossible for him, with the responsibility of the expedition upon his shoulders, to produce an excellence of detail of which the spirit did not pervade the commissioned mass. I believe the answer to be, that the constant thought, attention and effort required cannot be secured without stimulus, and that stimulus is lacking in our service. It may not be generally appreciated how little power exists, under our laws, to reward meritorious officers, or to place subordinate command in the hands of the most efficient. The President selects general officers and the appointees to some of the staff departments; there his power stops. All promotion in these departments and throughout the line is strictly by seniority; the efficient and the inefficient, the careless and the attentive, the sober and the intemperate advancing equally; if an officer avoids a court-martial the rest follows. There is no effective process of elimination of the inefficient; officers are examined for promotion, and if they cannot pass are supposed to go out of the service; but in the ten years of the operation of the law upon the subject, there is no single instance

of an officer having been deprived of his commission by its application, except for physical incapacity. Not only has merit no influence in the advancement of officers, but in normal times the natural rate of promotion is so slow that all officers become too old for their grades, and are apt to lose interest in the duties. This results from the small proportion of high to low officers in a military organization, and can be corrected only by artificial elimination, *i. e.*, the application of a method by which a sufficient number of officers, preferably the least efficient, shall retire from active service—such a rule as exists in every military and naval service of the world, with the sole exception of the army of the United States. The table below shows the ages at which officers can hope, under existing laws, to attain the various grades:

First Lieutenant	at 31.1 years.
Captain	" 43.5 "
Major	" 57.1 "
Lieutenant-Colonel	" 60.9 "
Colonel.	" 62.25 "

The figures show the average ages for all officers of the staff and line; their discouraging character is apparent, and receives illustration in the case of Captain H. J. Reilly, the commander of the American Light Battery, who was killed while directing the fire of his guns at the taking of the Imperial City. He was of the class of officers who can ill be spared; under his efficient command the battery had achieved a reputation in the Philippines, and during this expedition it had always been found where it was wanted, ready to do what was expected of it. His death as a Captain, after thirty-three years of service, was an honor to himself, but was a discredit to the system which kept an officer of his well-known merit in low grades for such a length of time. I believe the material of our army, both officers and men, to be the best in the world. No other nation has company officers of the average ability and education of our own; but the superiority shades away as their service progresses, and they get farther away from the rigorous system of stimulus and selection which spurred and winnowed them at the Military Academy, and which in other services is continued through all grades.

At the instance of the War Department, a bill was introduced in Congress at its last session designed to correct some of these evils; it provided that one promotion out of every three in the line should be made by selection, and that the selection should be

primarily in the hands of the officers themselves of the branch of the service concerned, a board of whom would submit three names to the President, who would from these make the promotion. The latter feature was to meet the objection of the Army, that selections made, as have been most of those for the staff departments, would be through political influence and not for merit. Another provision was that appointments for service in the staff departments would be made by boards of officers of those departments, without the feature of the submission of three names to the President. The subject of artificial elimination was not dealt with.

Administrations confronted with military difficulties are usually embarrassed by the insufficient number of troops, and, being themselves temporary, have strong reason for devoting their attention to the increase of the size of the army rather than to the introduction of reforms of permanent though slower benefit; the more especially as the augmentation itself carries a transient improvement in quality by promoting younger officers and affording, usually, occasion for the exercise of selection—the patched-up machine will tide over the emergency, and the unremoved deteriorating influences will not produce their old effect until it shall have become the instrument of other hands. But here was a case in which an administration made its first concern quality and not size, as far as the measure it recommended affects the greater part of the army, and it should have received corresponding encouragement. Far be from me the Cassandra task of attempting to persuade my countrymen that an army of any given size is a necessity for the Republic; if the views of certain persons upon this subject be correct, events will demonstrate it, and if the demonstration be accompanied by a lesson I have no doubt that it will be pluckily, if not good naturedly, received. But I believe that the people strongly desire that the military establishment which they are willing to pay for shall be of good quality, and I make this my apology for my representing that, unless reforms embodying principles similar to those above outlined be instituted, full efficiency will not be attained, and our army will continue to compare unfavorably with those of other nations.

There are many minds to which, in looking over the progress of the campaign, will be suggested the inquiry: What valuable

contribution has its conduct made to the cause of humanity in warfare? With so many nations acting together, what examples have they been able to afford each other of the successful use of methods designed to cause the distress of war to bear only on the combatant forces and governments, to the exclusion, as far as possible, of peaceful inhabitants? Immediately upon arrival it became necessary to employ largely native labor; this labor was always impressed, if not to be had voluntarily, but from the beginning it was paid for by the Americans at a satisfactory rate—twenty Mexican cents, ten cents American, with rice ration, per day. This practice was eventually adopted by all, but was said not to be followed for some time by several of the Powers. Private property, horses, carts, provisions, &c., were taken for public use, sometimes with compensation, oftentimes not, at least in the earlier stages. But in regard to the general matter of payment for value received, it is to be believed that, after the initial disorderly period was passed and a certain regularity and order had been established, the principle was quite generally observed. In regard to the personal treatment of non-combatants and wounded, much good cannot be said. The circumstances of the expedition were not such as to predispose the troops to a feeling of consideration toward the Chinaman, whose barbarous treatment of missionaries and their families was well known throughout the force; and the more or less popular character of the society guilty of it tended to involve the population in the detestation justly provoked, so that personal hostility prevailed to a much greater extent than in the case of an ordinary war between States. The majority of the natives had no other desire than that of safety for themselves and their belongings, and were willing to do anything to placate whatever party might be in local power; but this disposition, while saving them from continued cruelty, did not induce careful discrimination in the heat of an exciting situation. With all the explanation that can be made, stories of inexcusable brutalities were current throughout the camps, some indicating the loose rein to passions, others mere brutishness. None of the worst class of cases came under my personal observation, and all stories should be received with caution. One was told me by a fellow staff officer of the American Commander and is as worthy of complete credence as any testimony can be. He related that, while riding by a Russian

column on the march, he saw a soldier violently kick a child of some eight years, who was sitting on the edge of the road; and, as the blow of the heavy boot turned the child's body, he kicked him again in the face, sending him over backward into the corn. The assault was murderous, and could scarcely have had less effect than the permanent loss of the boy's eyesight; it was seen by the rest of the Russian column without other mark than of amusement, although from the formation there must have been officers near enough to have witnessed the act. At Tung Chow, while riding with a group of officers, one of them exclaimed: "Look at that dreadful thing!" Glancing up, I saw a commotion among a small group of Russian soldiers about seventy yards away, and it was explained that they had just dragged a Chinaman from the grass and stabbed him with bayonets. I did not see the act itself nor investigate it further, and am not a good witness as to the murder, the occurrence of which, however, I do not doubt. While riding alone about Tung Chow on the day of its entry, I found in an empty compound a Chinese coolie, lying face down, bound hand and foot, with his head brought back by his queue, which was tied to his hands, and his hands then tied to a fence. He was unconscious and breathing, but with a bullet through his body and no chance for his life. I cut him loose and arranged him so that he might die comfortably. Returning some time after, I found him apparently gone, but with some Japanese soldiers poking him with sticks to see if they could prod him into a sign of life. I, of course, knew nothing of the circumstances under which he got into the state in which I found him; he may have been guilty of the exasperating offense of "sniping." During the entire advance, and for a fortnight after, dead bodies of coolies floating in the river and lying about in odd places gave evidence of killing which must have been unjustifiable. Crimes against women were told of, including one instance of horrible cruelty to a husband who had interfered; but there is no reason for believing that these cases were more numerous than is inevitable under the circumstances, or that there was toleration for the offenses. One American soldier was brought to trial and conviction, and received a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment, and there were reports of just punishment in other commands. As to the wounded on the field of battle, there was general expectation of no quarter on either side; but, as none of the foreign wounded

fell into the hands of the Chinese, and as the latter usually got off while the invaders were far enough away to give them time to remove theirs, there was not much opportunity for the application of the pleasant principle. One instance came practically under my observation. At Peitsang, I was at the Chinese outpost at the powder depot almost immediately after its capture by the Japanese; Chinese soldiers apparently dead were lying about. As I rode along the embankment, I saw a Japanese soldier ahead hastily putting a cartridge into his gun, and after having passed him I heard the discharge. Calling back to my orderly asking what he had fired at, the reply was that he had fired down into a trench; for which there could have been but one object, although neither of us saw it. The justification for this was held to be that the Boxers and their sympathizers were fanatics whose dearest object was to kill foreigners, and that they would do what they could toward its accomplishment as long as life was left in them. Riding over the field a few minutes after this occurrence, I passed two wounded Chinamen in the grass, but their blood-thirsty enthusiasm, if they had had it, had waned, as they made no hostile demonstration.

Of looting there was much. Tientsin was thoroughly looted. At Peking there were no guards to prevent it until the day after the hands of the American force had been freed by the capture of the Imperial City. The earliest and most persistent looters were the Chinese themselves, either the soldiery and Boxers or the inhabitants. As soon as they considered the proper period to have arrived, they commenced operations and were willing to take high risks in carrying them on. The British looted openly and systematically, the plunder being turned in to a common store from which auction sales were held each afternoon at the British legation, under the direction of an officer; the proceeds to be used for the benefit of the soldiers. Other nationalities were believed to have imposed little check. When the city was divided up, the Americans placed guards over the portion assigned to them and quickly put a stop to disorderly proceedings. Their commanding general was strongly opposed to looting, as to all other forms of abuse of the natives; and he issued stringent orders in regard thereto, in the spirit of which he was supported by the officers, whose duties were lightened by the fact that robbery and cruelty are not found in the grain of the Ameri-

can soldier. Although some looting was done by Americans, it is believed to have been very much less than that by any other troops of the expedition.

Incendiary fires were common, and the route to Peking can be said to have been marked by burning villages. No instance is known of Americans starting these fires; and, in general, it is believed that the record of the Americans for humanity is indisputably better than that of any other troops.

On the whole, the campaign cannot be said to have marked for the foreign powers an advance in the diminution of the horrors of war, but must be recognized as rather a step backward; notwithstanding which, its conduct was so far better than Chinese standards that the tendency of its teaching must be for them in the right direction.

I arrived at Tientsin with the 14th Infantry from Manila on July 26th, as Chief Ordnance Officer of the expedition on the staff of General Chaffee. I was much of the time near the American commander and available for general staff purposes; and he honored me by making such use of my services. In this manner I had good opportunity for general observation. Like all officers, I was intensely interested in the showing made by the different forces; and, in the comparison, I found cause, as an American officer, for both congratulation and dissatisfaction. Removal of the reasons for dissatisfaction is not apt to result from much of the criticism which has been printed; it has been apparent to the critics that something has been wrong, and, in casting about for underlying causes, they have been misled by too ready acceptance as facts of unverified rumors, and in some cases of mere guesses. The harshest critics have been those organs of public opinion which, in their disapproval and discouragement of the whole military institution, have contributed most to the unsatisfactory conditions of which they wrongly appreciate the manifestations. The inadequate though perhaps wearisome detail of the preceding pages can be summarized as follows: In the character of their material, animate and inanimate, the troops of the United States excelled; in all the results of liberal organization, training and stimulus, the product of national interest in and fostering encouragement of the military arm, they were outclassed by the forces of the other nations.

WILLIAM CROZIER.